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1. The scope of the dissertation
The problem of intentionality is at the intersection of the research fields of human language
and cognition  as  well  as the  philosophy of language and pragmatics.  Although the word,
intentionality is not present in our everyday language use, this does not ensure that the term is
univocal and unambiguous in scientific context.  Many studies emphasises the necessity of
defining intentionality and provide different definitions of it. However, the problem itself has
a wider scope: the question concerns to the nature of intentionality as well as its role in the
domains  of  language,  communication,  cognition,  social  acts,  rationality  and  cooperation.
Although each field is connected to the other, it is impossible to investigate all of them in the
expected comprehensive fashion. Therefore, I must focus on a single, particular problem of
intentionality.
Intentionality  is  defined  in  its  widest  interpretation  as  aboutness,  direction  upon  a
mental content or reference to it. The particular analytical definitions of intentionality in the
narrow sense differ from each other regarding their different foci on the nature of mental
states (intentions) and on the nature of their mental contents. The same method of narrowing
applies  for  the  discipline  of  pragmatics.  My  dissertation  is  concerned  with  the  different
approaches to intentions in the traditional, analytical philosophy based linguistic pragmatics
and in relevance theory. If we overview the history of linguistic pragmatics, it will be revealed
that  the  first  author  addressing  the  question  of  intentionality  was  Austin  (1940/1970,
1946/1970,  1956a/1970, 1956b/1970,  1962a,  1962b,  1966/1970) (Németh  T.  2007, 2008a,
Bódog 2008: 24). He argued that the felicity conditions of the particular illocutionary acts
contain  feelings,  intentions  (in  the  sense  of  want)  and  thoughts  that  the  person
performing/carrying out the given act must possess. These conditions have undergone serious
investigations  made  by  Searle  (1969,  1979,  1983)  who  tried  to  individuate  the  sincerity
conditions of illocutionary acts only by their corresponding intentions. Searle is concerned
with the role of the speaker in communicative language use and tried to approach it from the
third person perspective of the so-called belief-desire-intention psychology. Contrary to the
Searlean focus, Grice (1957, 1975, 1982) adopted the perspective of the hearer. His so-called
inferential pragmatics investigates the role of the hearer in communicative language use. The
central  concepts  of  the  Gricean  and  the  neo-Gricean  pragmatics  involve  the  speaker's
intention and implicature, and their analysis can shed light on the problem of intentional states
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in communicative language use. My dissertation only focuses on the approaches of Austin,
Searle and Grice, since the neo-Gricean approaches preserve the Gricean concepts, and the
received version of the speech act theory is the Searlean one. The Searlean and the Gricean
approaches  were  amalgamated  by  relevance  theory  that  conceptualises the  naturalisation
claim of the analytical philosophy based pragmatics in its  strongest form. To sum up, the
present dissertation investigates the pragmatics of Austin, Searle, Grice and relevance theory
from the perspective of their approaches of intentional states.
2. The goals of the dissertation
The main goal of the present dissertation is to demonstrate that the traditional, philosophically
motivated  linguistic  pragmatics  and  relevance  theory  is  incapable  to  give  a  proper,
comprehensive  account  of  intentional  states  since  their  scope  is  limited  to  the  causally
effective  explanation  of  speaker's  intentions.  I  reach my goal  through the  analysis  of  the
pragmatics of Austin, Searle, Grice and relevance theory. There are plenty of papers related to
intentionality  in  the  field  of  pragmatics,  yet,  the  outcome  of  only  the  above-mentioned
(Austin,  Searle,  Grice  and  relevance  theory)  approaches  is  widespread  in  contemporary
pragmatical theorising.
According to my main goal, I must tackle the philosophical foundations of intentionality
that  determine  the  approaches  of  intentionality  in  the  early  period  of  the  philosophically
motivated  pragmatics.  I  also  need  to  examine  the  naturalisation  claim  of  contemporary
cognitive science that affects relevance theoretical pragmatics.
The main goal of the present dissertation is reached by the accomplishment of three
subgoals.
1. I analyse the approaches to intentional states in the pragmatics of Austin, Searle,
Grice and relevance theory and argue that the approaches to intentionality of the
received  version  of  speech  act  theory  (as  developed  by Searle),  of  the  Gricean
inferential  pragmatics  and  of  the  relevance  theory  reduce  the  intentions  to  be
examined.
2. I demonstrate that such a reduction has emerged due to the individualistic fashion of
analytical philosophy of mind and intentionality.
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3. I argue that the state of art in the traditional, reductive and individualist pragmatics
is oriented to the third person psychological perspective, which can only investigate
the causally efficient reconstruction of intentional states of the speaker.
3. Methods used
My dissertation is composed of three main chapters:  after the first introductory chapter,  I
outline the theoretical landscape on the pragmatically relevant problems of intentionality in
the  second  chapter.  In  the  following,  third  chapter  the  Austinian,  Gricean,  Searlean  and
relevance  theoretical  approaches  to  intentionality  are  presented.  The  fourth  chapter
summarizes the revealed problems of intentionality in pragmatics in a thematic manner.
The  second  chapter  starts  with  the  analysis  of  the  Psychologie  vom  empirischen
Standpunkt (1874)  written  by  Franz  Brentano  who was  the  father  of  the  philosophy and
psychology of intentionality in the modern age. Applying two different kinds of analyses of
this  paper  is  important  because  I  am  able  to  demonstrate  how  the  linguistic  and  the
representational  turns  of  philosophy  made  the  Brentanian  approach  understandable  and
applicable  to  the  analytical  philosophers.  After  the  critical  examination  of  the  analytic,
representational interpretation of Brentano's theses, I illustrate through the example of naïve
theory mind how this interpretation invades into cognitive psychology. In the second chapter I
project that the classical analytical interpretation of intentionality and the approach to naïve
theory  of  mind are  of  great  importance  because  the  traditional  philosophically  motivated
pragmatics  emerged  from  the  philosophy  of  ordinary  language  use,  and  the  relevance
theoretical approach inclines the intentionality interpretation of naïve theory of mind.
In the third chapter I demonstrate the approaches to intentionality by Austin, Searle,
Grice and relevance theory. The main body of the third chapter is based on the comparative
and contrastive analysis of the works of the above mentioned authors and their theories. The
Searlean  approach  to  intentionality  is  contrasted  with  Austin's  framework,  the  Gricean
interpretation  of  communicative  intention  is  compared  with  the  relevance  theoretical
perspective.  In  this  section  I  show  evidence  for  the  circularity  present  in  the  relevance
theoretical approach (which is) based on the careless acceptance and application of the naïve
theory  of  mind.  In  the  fourth  chapter  I  summarize  the  main results  of  my analyses  in  a
thematic fashion. 
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4. Results
4.1. Approaches to intentionality in the analytical tradition
In the second chapter of my dissertation I demonstrate that in the second half of the
twentieth  century  a  consensual  standpoint  arose  about  the  nature  of  intentionality  in  the
philosophy of language and mind, which is based on the Brentanian theses of intentionality on
the one hand, but transform them in the traditional analytic way on the other hand. According
to this analytical claim, (i) we possess mental states that direct upon some kind of mental
contents,  (ii)  these  contents  can  be  internal  or  external,  (iii)  the  mental  states  can  be
represented as attitudes, and their contents as propositions, (iv) we accept the view of inner
realism regarding to propositional attitudes, (v) we assume mental representations behind the
propositional  attitudes.  In this chapter I demonstrate  that the view of intentionality in the
received version of cognitive psychology is not inherited from the original Brentanian theses,
but from the above mentioned analytical consensual standpoint. This heritage is unreflected in
the field of cognitive psychology; therefore, it leads to contradictory theoretical practice.
4.2. Intentionality in speech act theory
Pragmaticians claim that the father of speech act theory was Austin. The commonly held
view states that his approach was later elaborated in the received version of speech act theory
(as developed by Searle), so it is inevitable to discuss the Austinian notion of intention. As a
result of my analysis, I conclude that despite Austin’s analytical commitments (as he is one of
the founders of philosophy of ordinary language use), his view of intentionality does not fit
into  the  consensual  analytical  approach:  Austin  rejects  the  inner  realist  position  of
intentionality  and proposes a natural,  direct  version of it.  He emphasizes  that in ordinary
language use intentions have either individual or interpersonal character, and the lexical and
linguistic individuation of them is not trivial. He proposes, therefore, that the intention based
individuation of illocutionary acts would be a highly uncertain process.
In contemporary pragmatics we refer to Austin as a historical figure in pragmatics, and
we tend to think that his speech act theory was elaborated and systematised by his pupil,
Searle.  After  the  collation  of  intentionality  related  establishments  in  the  two  versions  of
speech act theory (one of Austin and one of Searle), I confirm the verdict of Rajagopalan
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(2000), namely that the received version of speech act theory is not a continuation,  but a
redraft of the classical, Austinian framework.
I  demonstrated  by  the  comparison  of  the  Austinian  and  Searlean  approaches  to
intentionality that speech act theory is not homogenous regarding to its different views of
intentionality. Despite the fact that Austin and Searle both argue for individual and collective
intentions,  Austin  treats  collective  intentions  as  interpersonal,  while  Searle  treats  them as
individual. The Austinian framework argues against the dichotomic system of intentions and
conventions (which is invisible for those who only read How to do things with words (1962b)
by Austin). Contrary to Austin, Searle — despite his efforts to integrate both individual and
collective intentions into the system of sincerity conditions of illocutionary acts — sketches
two  distinctive  worlds  for  individual  and  collective,  social  factors.  Although  Austin
distinguishes  personal  and  interpersonal  factors  of  intentions  as  well,  he  argues  for  the
individual nature of beliefs, the social nature of knowledge and that interpersonal contents
(like  knowledge)  are  irreducible  to  individual  states.  The  Searlean  account  of  such
externalism  is  difficult  to  establish  because  he  pretends  to  accept  the  legitimacy  of
interpersonal  content  (via  the  acceptance  of  collective  intentions),  meanwhile  he  puts
collective intentions in the heads of individual speakers (therefore, he denies the legitimacy of
external contents).
4.3. The Gricean notion of communicative intention
The scope of intentional phenomena in Gricean inferential pragmatics is highly reductive; it
only sheds light on the communicative intention of the speaker. According to his framework
of speaker's intentions, mental content together with its intentional aspects will become part of
the communicative language use if the speaker is led by some kind of intention while the
hearer is led by the reflexive intention to recognize speaker's intention. My analysis confirmed
that  the reinterpretation of the structure of the speaker's intention necessarily involves the
distinction of mental and non-mental factors. Although Grice emphasizes the adequacy of the
personal  level  explanation of  communicative  intention,  the later  references  typically  pose
intentionality to the sub-personal level (this method is excessively used by relevance theory).
Whether we pose intentionality on the personal or the sub-personal level, we have to face the
fact  that  intentions  belong  to  the  individual  speaker,  his  intentions  are  invisible  for  the
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communicative partner. The hearer must use his own inferential apparatus in order to interpret
the speaker’s utterance.
The  Gricean  theoretical  framework  clearly  shows  that  there  was  a  shift  in  the
intentionality related discussions of philosophy of ordinary language use: while the focus of
the Austinian analyses was on the exceptional cases of ordinary language use in order to shed
light on the causes of unsuccessful communicative language use, the Gricean analyses address
the  conditions  for  successful  communicative  language  use  in  the  absence  of  the  directly
accessible mental contents and intentions of the speaker.
Since  Grice  favours  mentalism,  he  prefers  the  individualistic  perspective  of
intentionality as well. While his approach to intentionality only focuses on the communicative
intention of the speaker, his views adopted by cognitive psychology made him the father of
the naïve theory of mind (which clearly tires to give a full-fledged account of intentionality). I
argue that this appointment is misleading because (i) Grice himself discredited the legitimacy
of the cognitive approaches to intentionality, (ii) his interpretation of M-intention is reflexive,
and this reflexivity is of an interpersonal nature, and (iii) there are more than one possible
readings of his Cooperative Principle.
4.4. Relevance theory
Relevance  theory  combines  the  Searlean  and  Gricean  approaches  to  communication,
eliminates the partiality of their account to communication and communicative language use,
and it also redefines pragmatics as a component of cognition. I demonstrate that this dual
heritage is present in the relevance theoretical approach to intentionality as well. 
The views of relevance theory on intentionality are based on the features of cognitive
science committed to the consensual standpoint of analytic tradition (as it is defined in 4.1).
According to such analytic fundamentals, relevance theory as well as the Searleian approach
to intentionality reflect features of individualism (because it partially integrates the Searleian
code model of information processing), they explicate inner realism regarding the states of
intentions and reduce the intentions of communicative language use to beliefs, desires and
intentions. Relevance theory as well as the Gricean approach assume that during the processes
of understanding, which require cognitive efforts,  we have to infer the partner's invisible,
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directly inaccessible, private mental states and their contents in order to work out the optimal
interpretation of his utterance. According to this scenario of interpretation, understanding may
be uncertain whenever information conveying and processing involves intentional elements.
Relevance theory assumes that a proper theory on the intentionality of communicative
language  use  must  deal  with  the  ostensive  behaviour  of  the  communicator  and  the
metarepresentational processes of his or her partner. Such metarepresentation is based on the
mechanisms of  the  naïve  theory  of  mind.  The  latter  element  of  the  relevance  theoretical
approach to intentionality leads to the circularity of its explanation of communication because
relevance theory uses the cognitive psychological explanations to the naïve theory of mind in
order to argue for the legitimacy of the analytical consensual standpoint of intentionality, such
standpoint is the basis of the cognitive psychology of the naïve theory of mind.
4.5. The problems of the traditional, consensual approach to intentionality
One of  the  aims  of  my  dissertation  is  to  thematise  the  problems of  intentionality  in  the
pragmatics of communicative language use. It is important to stress that at the moment there
are  no  solutions  to  these  problems  inside  the  traditional,  philosophically  motivated
pragmatics,  partially  because  the  problems themselves  are  not  articulated  well  within the
field.
The first problem: The reduction of intentions
The  examined  pragmatic  theories  (except  the  Austinian  speech  act  theory)  reduce  the
intentional  states  to beliefs,  desires  and intentions  as  propositional attitudes.  This method
presupposes that (i) the mental states as intentional states can be unproblematically identify
with their  linguistic  description and (ii)  these states form mental  representations,  so inner
realism is true.
The second problem: The individualisation of intentions
The acceptation and application of the above mentioned presuppostions lead to the following
controversial  situation:  the  theories  of  intersubjective  cognition  are  commited  to  the
solipsistic account of representational theory of mind.  According to the first  problem, the
examined pragmatic theories (except the Austinian speech act theory) handle the intentions of
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communicative  language  use  in  an  individualist  fashion.  Searle,  Grice  and  the  relevance
theoretical  approach  apply  Shannon  and  Weaver's  cybernetic  model  of  information
processing. One of the consequences of the acceptation of this model is that the traditional
theories must deal with the fact that understanding during communicative language use is
hazy  and  uncertain.  Since  we  think  of  communication  as  information  conveying  and
processing, the application of the cybernetic model is the most plausible choice as a basis of
modeling communication.Tracing back the indirectness of understanding to the cybernetic
model suggests what happens to the intentions behind the linguistic choices of the speaker.
However,  these  intentions  are  often  not  present  in  the  causally  efficient  explanations  of
communicative  language  use.  Due  to  the  cybernetic  model  and  the  indirectness  of
understanding,  the  hearer  must  reconstruct  the  speakers'  intentions.  In  addition,  this
reconstruction in causally efficient even without considering all speaker's intentions.
The third problem: the third person psychological explanation of intentions
I argue that Searle and relevance theory try to give a full-fledged theory on the intentionality
of communicative language use, but their accounts are limited to the beliefs, desires and in-
tentions of individual minds. The fact that Searle consciously neglects and rewrites the Aus-
tinian account of intentionality and his methods of theory building and that relevance theory is
bound by the mechanistic methods of computational cognitive psychology clearly shows that
each of these accounts investigates intentionality from the third person perspective.  Grice
himself uses this perspective as well since he investigates the role of the hearer during inten-
tional communicative language use.
This third person perspective necessarily works on the causally efficient explanations of
intentional states, therefore, it is inadequate to use it to reveal all of the speaker's intentions
during communicative language use.
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